In most cases, radio equipment manufactured in the last 12 years can be converted to narrow-band operation by reprogramming.  FCC licenses must be amended to show narrow band emission.  Replacement is necessary only for very old equipment.  There is no need to change to new frequencies or implement digital modulation.

One of the most credible sources of online information about the FCC’’s narrow band mandate is http://www.narrowbandinglaw.com/.  This website is sponsored by the Telecommunications Group of the Shulman Roger law firm in Potomac, MD.

Here’s the message from Sprint:

—– Forwarded Message —-
From: “Pinneke, Dale [BMG]” <Dale.Pinneke@sprint.com>
Sent: Thu, September 2, 2010 2:19:59 PM
Subject: FCC Mandate for Land Mobile Radio Users

Hello  my name Dale Pinneke from Sprint. The purpose of my email is to find out what you are doing to comply with the Government (FCC ) Narrow-Banding Mandate which requires companies like yours to move off of the radio bands you are on today because it is going to be reallocated  for Public Safety only. This means that by 2011 you cannot add anymore users to your group and by 2012 you will be forced to buy new equipment and move to a lower band.

We have a special program at Sprint to help companies like yours where we will buy back your old equipment , program the new equipment, provide training and ongoing dedicated support (STS white glove support , not the regular Sprint 800 number but a team that knows your account and understands what solution your company has)

I would like to set an appointment with you to discuss your options……what day/time will work for you?

Thank you,

Dale

Dale Pinneke
Business Account Executive
Sprint Nextel Corp.
Dale.Pinneke@sprint.com
408-608-7501 Mobile

–

I encourage you to use extreme caution in proceeding with P25 digital trunked radio projects until true open standards are established and the performance issues are significantly improved.  Or perhaps P25 will soon be declared to be obsolete in favor of a broadband alternative for public safety voice communication.

—

PUBLIC SAFETY AND HOMELAND SECURITY BUREAU SEEKS COMMENT ON INCREASING PUBLIC SAFETY INTEROPERABILITY BY PROMOTING COMPETITION FOR PUBLIC SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES

PS Docket No. 10-168

Comments Due:  Sept. 20, 2010

Reply Comments Due:  Oct. 18, 2010

Our Nation’s first responders rely on communications systems supplied by a small number of equipment providers to support mission-critical communications.  The characteristics of how public safety equipment is developed and provided may impact the interoperability and efficiency of communications between first responders, which could potentially threaten lives and property.

Because of the important role these communications systems play in supporting our Nation’s public safety personnel, it is imperative that we explore all potential barriers to achieving nationwide interoperability for both broadband and narrowband communications, and determine what, if any, actions the Commission should take in this area.  In particular, we note the recent letter from the leadership of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy in Commerce to Chairman Genachowski, seeking information on these issues, including the state of competition in the public safety equipment and device market, the use of proprietary standards by public safety equipment manufacturers, and the impact that these issues may have on public safety interoperability.[1] Accordingly, we seek comment on the following:

1. What are the factors that affect the current state of competition in the provision of public safety communications equipment?  Are there any additional barriers to additional manufacturers supplying network equipment to the public safety community for narrowband communications?    For broadband communications?
2. How would additional competition in the provision of public safety communications equipment improve narrowband or broadband interoperability?  Conversely, what impact does the current state of competition in the provision of public safety communications equipment and devices have on interoperability?  Assuming additional competition would benefit public safety interoperability, what actions could the Commission take to improve competition in the provision of public safety communications equipment?
3. What are the limitations of Project 25 in promoting narrowband public safety communications interoperability?  What actions, if any, should the Commission take to rectify these limitations?
4. Could open standards for public safety equipment increase competition?  What actions could the Commission take to facilitate openness?
5. As the Commission considers requirements for the 700 MHz broadband public safety network, are there any requirements on public safety equipment or network operators that would increase competition in the provision of public safety equipment?  How can the Commission’s work on requirements for the 700 MHz broadband public safety network be leveraged to promote interoperability between narrowband and broadband networks?

This action is taken under delegated authority pursuant to Sections 0.131 and 0.331 of the Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.131, 0.331.

Interested parties may file comments on or before September 20, 2010, and reply comments on or before October 18, 2010.   Comments may be filed using the Commission’s Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS) or by filing paper copies.[2] Comments filed through the ECFS can be sent as an electronic file via the Internet to http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/ecfs/.  Generally, only one copy of an electronic submission must be filed.  If multiple docket or rulemaking numbers appear in the caption of the proceeding, commenters must transmit one electronic copy of the comments to each docket or rulemaking number referenced in the caption.  In completing the transmittal screen, commenters should include their full name, U.S. Postal Service mailing address, and the applicable docket or rulemaking numbers.  All filings concerning this Public Notice should refer to PS Docket No. 10-168.  Parties may also submit an electronic comment by Internet e-mail.  To get filing instructions for e-mail comments, commenters should send an e-mail to ecfs@fcc.gov, and should include the following words in the body of the message, “get form.”  A sample form and directions will be sent in reply.  Parties who choose to file by paper must file an original and four copies of each filing.  If more than one docket or rulemaking number appears in the caption of this proceeding, commenters must submit two additional copies for each additional docket or rulemaking number.

Paper filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial overnight courier, or by first-class or overnight U.S. Postal Service mail (although we continue to experience delays in receiving U.S. Postal Service mail).  All filings must be addressed to the Commission’s Secretary, Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.  Parties are strongly encouraged to file comments electronically using the Commission’s ECFS.

• Effective December 28, 2009, all hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for the Commission’s Secretary must be delivered to FCC Headquarters at 445 12^th St., SW, Room TW-A325, Washington, DC  20554.  The filing hours at this location are 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.  All hand deliveries must be held together with rubber bands or fasteners.  Any envelopes must be disposed of before entering the building.  PLEASE NOTE:  The Commission’s former filing location at 236 Massachusetts Avenue, NE is permanently closed.

• Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service Express Mail and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9300 East Hampton Drive, Capitol Heights, MD  20743.

• U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority mail should be addressed to 445 12^th Street, SW, Washington DC  20554.

Parties shall also serve one copy with the Commission’s copy contractor, Best Copy and Printing, Inc. (BCPI), Portals II, 445 12th Street, S.W., Room CY-B402, Washington, D.C. 20554, (202) 488-5300, or via e-mail to fcc@bcpiweb.com.

Documents in PS Docket No. 10-168 will be available for public inspection and copying during business hours at the FCC Reference Information Center, Portals II, 445 12^th St. S.W., Room CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554.  The documents may also be purchased from BCPI, telephone (202) 488-5300, facsimile (202) 488-5563, TTY (202) 488-5562, e-mail fcc@bcpiweb.com.

To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an e-mail to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice), 202-418-0432 (tty).

This matter shall be treated as a “permit-but-disclose” proceeding in accordance with the Commission’s ex parte rules.[3] Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentations must contain summaries of the substance of the presentations and not merely a listing of the subjects discussed.  More than a one- or two-sentence description of the views and arguments presented generally is required.[4] Other requirements pertaining to oral and written presentations are set forth in section 1.1206(b) of the Commission’s rules.[5]

For further information, contact Jennifer A. Manner, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, (202) 418-3619, Jennifer.Manner@fcc.gov.

-FCC-

[2] See Electronic Filing of Documents in Rulemaking Proceedings, GC Docket No. 97-113, Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 11322 (1998).

[3] 47 C.F.R. § 1.1200 et seq.

[4] See 47 C.F.R. § 1.1206(b)(2).

[5] 47 C.F.R. § 1.1206(b).

I’m glad the FCC has recognized that P25 is a dead-end, however I’m concerned that it may be assuming a cellular-like broadband network is the solution for interoperable public-safety voice communication.  It is not,  and I am confident that the public-safety community would ultimately reject common-carrier hosted radio systems.

Packet-oriented digital voice communication over radio using ad-hoc networks in the area of an incident will prevail.  This architecture will allow reliable on-scene communication without relying on base station infrastructure that may not be in close proximity to the incident.  Radios on vehicles will act as network routers and forward data packets containing voice frames to base station radios.  This architecture will be scalable and affordable, unlike the highly centralized P25 digital trunked radio systems that are being sold today.

Click here to view the official document on the Committee on Energy and Commerce web site.

The following questions were posed by Chairman Waxman, followed by Chairman Genachowski’s answers.

Question

1. Please provide a list of the top four vendors of public safety narrowband equipment and their respective market shares. If the FCC does not track this information independently, please use public references to provide these details.

Answer:

The FCC does not formally monitor market share information of public safety narrowband equipment vendors. However, publicly available information indicates that the Motorola Corporation (Motorola) has a significant share of the United States public safety narrowband equipment market. For example, a June 9, 2010 Washington Post article states that Motorola’s market share in the public safety equipment market is 80%. Public information also shows that the following vendors, among others, compete in this sector, but with significantly smaller market share overall than Motorola: PlantCML (subsidiary of EADS), Harris Corporation, Thales, Kenwood, and RELM Wireless.

Question

2. Have proprietary solutions affected interoperability, innovation, cost or competition in the market for public safety communications equipment?

• a. How would the greater use of open standards affect these factors?
• b. What steps should the FCC take, if any, to encourage the use of open standards in public safety communications?

Answer:

The staff of the FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (Bureau) believe that proprietary solutions and market dominance play an important role in the problems with interoperability, innovation, cost and competition in the market for public safety communications equipment. This conclusion is consistent with the National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP) issued by the Department of Homeland Security, which states (page 24) that “[t]he proprietary nature of many communications technologies creates an ongoing challenge to system connectivity and establishing interoperability among them.” Similarly, Dereck Orr, the Program Manager of the Public Safety Communications Research Program of the National Institute of Science and Technology recently testified before the Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, that interoperability is impacted by the proprietary nature of public safety communications equipment.

Bureau staff and many outside experts have found proprietary solutions to have a significant impact on the cost of public safety communications equipment. This, perhaps, is illustrated best by comparing widely-available commercial wireless and the proprietary public safety narrowband communications equipment. For example, the staff’s research has found that while a state-of-the-art consumer cellular device typically costs a few hundred dollars, a typical land mobile radio for public safety communications may cost as much as $5,000. This is at least partly because public safety is unable to capture the benefits of competition and economies of scale associated with equipment and devices that are manufactured for the commercial consumer marketplace, Commission staff expect that leveraging the commercial mass market could reduce costs for public safety devices substantially – even with such requirements as ruggedizing, many experts suggest that handset costs should be measured in hundreds of dollars not thousands.

Similarly, Bureau staff and many outside experts believe that proprietary equipment negatively impacts innovation. Project 25 (P25), the leading standard for public safety narrowband communications, has taken more than 20 years to develop and is still not complete. This fact is almost without parallel in the standards environment and one that many experts would not associate with successful, leading edge products. As a result, P25 systems still rely upon proprietary solutions and the beneficial effect of competition through open standards is not fully realized. A comparison to Tetra, a European standard similar to P25 but which was successfully completed in 1995, makes this stagnation clear. Though similar in function to P25, Tetra products are both more spectrally efficient than P25 and significantly cheaper. Our information suggests that this is the result of a competitive marketplace based on open standards. The protracted development of P25 has allowed vendors to take advantage of selling proprietary solutions.

Another key to ensuring competition in the public safety equipment market is open standards. However, open standards are not enough. To this end, I have directed the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau to issue a Public Notice soon (Competition Public Notice) that will look at the impact of promoting competition for public safety communications technologies.

Further, the Commission has a unique opportunity through the FCC’s Emergency Response Interoperability Center (ERIC) to create a national framework for the deployment and operation of an interoperable public safety broadband network. This framework will enable a strong market to be created to serve the needs of the public safety community. This in turn will lead to greater competition, which will result in greater innovation in the public safety broadband communications device and equipment market.

Question:

3. Please provide information on whether the public safety interoperable voice network, governed by Project 25, has achieved true interoperability.

1. a. Has interoperability been hindered by a lack of competition in equipment and device availability?
2. To the extent that interoperability has been hindered, please provide specific examples.

Answer:

A broad array of experts have observed that existing public safety narrowband systems have not achieved true interoperability. As the 9/11 Commission concluded, the absence of interoperable communications capabilities among public safety organizations at the local, state, and federal levels was a problem of the highest order (page 293). Unfortunately, there has been little progress in solving this problem. Further, the Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (pages 163-182) found that public safety on the ground lacked the interoperability required for seamless on-the-ground coordination. And, during a hearing held on May 27, 2010, by the House Science and Technology Committee, Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation on Interoperability in Public Safety Communications Equipment, the majority of witnesses recognized that additional work was required to achieve interoperability for the public safety narrowband systems.

There is insufficient information available on the impact of limited competition in equipment and device availability for public safety communications. By contrast, the Commission has data from the commercial industry indicating that the highly competitive commercial mobile industry equipment market has had long standing technical solutions to interoperability, including PSTN voice calling, text messaging, roaming and IP connectivity. Thus, a central feature of the forthcoming Competition Public Notice noted above is to seek comment on whether and to what extent the interoperability for public safety narrowband voice communications has been hindered by a lack of competition in equipment and device availability, and how this can be remedied in the future.

Question:

4. Does the current structure of the public safety equipment market hinder efforts to achieve interoperability for a broadband public safety network? If so, please provide a description of possible steps the Commission might take to remedy this action.

Answer:

The current structure of the public safety equipment market may hinder efforts to achieve interoperability for a broadband public safety network. To remedy this state of affairs, the National Broadband Plan recommended an incentive-based partnership approach that leverages commercial technology and economies of scale, including the commercial deployment of a broadband wireless network using the D block. By leveraging commercial broadband deployment for consumers in the 700 MHz band, public safety will have access to lower cost equipment and devices, additional capacity, and increased redundancy and resiliency. In addition, by ensuring that public safety technology remains within the mainstream of commercial technology evolution, public safety applications and services will necessarily be based on open, global standards.

Question:

5. Section 101(b) of the staff discussion draft sets forth criteria for the Commission to consider in establishing rules for interoperability. How should this list be revised to ensure that interoperability is achieved in the broadband network, unlike the “failure” that occurred in the narrowband network? What technical and operational framework might be more appropriate to ensure interoperability on a future nationwide wireless public safety broadband network?

Answer:

A broad framework for interoperability is essential to ensuring that this network is interoperable from day one and remains so as the technology evolves. The Bureau staff believes that interoperability can be achieved and maintained only through a combination of technology standards, license conditions, network governance, funding conditions and regulations. If any of these factors is missing, interoperability will not be achieved.

The staff discussion draft includes necessary elements for consideration in establishing rules as part of this broad framework. The Commission, , however, notes that any path forward should permit flexibility to identify additional criteria identified through any rulemaking process. To that end, the FCC recently issued a Public Notice for additional information on interoperability to help effectuate the work of the Emergency Response Interoperability Center (ERIC) to create an interoperability framework. Comments were filed in response to this Public Notice on July 19, 2010. Further, the Commission will receive additional information on the impact of competition in the equipment market in response to the upcoming Competition Public Notice. All of this information, along with the experience that ERIC and the FCC gains from reviewing and acting on the interoperability showings submitted by waiver recipients on July 19, 2010, will assist the FCC in identifying any additional criteria necessary to the creation of an effective interoperability regime.

In addition to the promulgation of rules, a significant challenge in achieving interoperability involves ensuring that the thousands of independent public safety jurisdictions comply with the appropriate interoperability framework. While the FCC can utilize its licensing regime and its enforcement authority to bring this about, it will also be very important to condition any grant program on compliance with these important interoperability requirements. It will also be imperative that other Federal agencies, including the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security, who work closely with public safety agencies on governance and standard operating procedures, ensure that the proper procedures are in place so all can be certain of interoperability from day one of this network.

Question:

6. Can interoperability requirements applied to the wireless public safety broadband network be utilized to promote interoperability between narrowband and broadband networks?

Answer:

While creating an interoperable public safety broadband network will not, in and of itself, solve all the troubling interoperability problems faced by existing narrowband networks, it does present an important opportunity to make progress in this area. In the short term, there is the possibility of technical interoperability requirements that would promote narrowband and broadband network interoperability. For example, this can be done through the use of gateway and other equipment. In the longer term, it may be possible to support mission critical voice communications that currently are provided only on narrowband systems. This ability will enable public safety to begin to migrate off of existing narrowband networks and end up with a single device for all of their communications needs using the latest technologies and on a cost-effective basis.

/—/

• The appearance of impropriety (part 1)
• The appearance of impropriety (part 2)
• The appearance of impropriety (part 3)

San Francisco Bay Area to Deploy a LTE Network (from Cellular News)

­Motorola and the Public Safety Agencies within the USA’s San Francisco Bay Area have entered an agreement to build a 700 MHz LTE system. As part of the Bay Area Regional Interoperable Communications System (BayRICS) plan, the system will serve multiple agencies across the greater bay area, including San Francisco, Alameda County/Oakland, Contra Costa County, as well as the cities of Santa Clara and Sunnyvale. This broadband system provides an overlay to the existing Project 25 standards based IP cores and networks.

The Public Safety LTE system will be installed this year and is expected to be operational in early 2011.

This first phase includes an LTE core, 10 sites and 330 Motorola Public Safety LTE user modems to provide Bay Area responders access to a host of media rich applications delivered over the new broadband network for increased public safety information sharing.

“This agreement represents a first step in realizing the BayRICS vision for a unified, state-of-the-art, mission critical voice and broadband multimedia network,” said Laura Phillips, general manager of the Bay Area UASI. “Combining a Public Safety hardened LTE overlay network with our Project 25 voice and data networks, we have the opportunity to equip our first responders with the advanced communications tools they need to better protect themselves and our communities.”

Article published on 30th July 2010 by http://www.cellular-news.com/

–

The Pennsylvanie State Senate Law and Justice Committee heard testimony regarding the State’s digital public-safety radio system on April 19, 2010. Users of the radio system testified as to horrific performance problems and pleaded to the Committee that the State’s VHF analog conventional radio system be preserved.

The Pennsylvania State radio system is based on the OpenSky product from Harris/Macom, however my research and experience shows that users of large digital public-safety radio systems from other manufacturers report similar problems. The problems aren’t limited to to OpenSky systems. Click here for articles related to this topic.

What happens after the P25 and OpenSky digital radio bubble bursts?  Click here for my opinion.

–

May 29, 2010, 10:00AM

The state of Oregon’s plan to build a sprawling emergency radio network is a year behind schedule, and state officials now say they can’t be sure what the project — estimated at $485 million — will actually cost taxpayers.

The Oregon Wireless Interoperability Network, or OWIN, is designed to let police, firefighters, highway crews, rescue teams and other public safety officials across Oregon talk to each other on their radios, something they can’t do now. The federal government is requiring public safety agencies to switch to new frequencies by the start of 2013.

The Legislature approved OWIN five years ago to meet the deadline, and it’s become one the biggest construction and technology efforts that Oregon has ever tackled.

But the project is in trouble.

The radio network is supposed to be made up of about 300 microwave towers, most stationed atop Oregon ridges and mountains.

But an examination by The Oregonian has found that OWIN officials have only six sites ready for construction. Crews haven’t broken ground on more than a dozen towers that were supposed to be done by now. And an outside consultant found OWIN has been operating without cost controls or a comprehensive schedule that can tell project officials if they can meet their deadlines.

In February, lawmakers got so frustrated with OWIN’s inability to account for its progress that they froze most of the project’s funding, leaving just enough cash to let the agency start some tower sites.

“I’m just waiting for one report that says the OWIN project is stable — just one,” said Senate President Peter Courtney, D-Salem.

Now, state officials and legislators must weigh releasing the project’s funds as they face billions in budget shortfalls and projected deficits that likely mean cuts to police, prisons, education, health care and protections for children, the elderly and the mentally ill.

In two recent interviews, OWIN officials told The Oregonian the project is on schedule. But agency documents, released to the newspaper under the state’s public records law, raise doubts about the claim.

An OWIN official said in a public meeting last week that, under its current pace and schedule, the project won’t be done until late 2013 or 2014. That’s a year behind the deadline set by the federal government. He said OWIN would in some cases have to double its speed to finish on time.

Lindsay Ball, the project’s director, continues to maintain the project is on schedule but said changes are being made to make sure the project moves faster.

“We have X number of sites and we have to get them done by 2013,” Ball said. “Everything that I’ve been told to date is that’s doable.”

In freezing the project’s funding, the Ways and Means Committee also pushed Gov. Ted Kulongoski to move the OWIN project from under the control of the Oregon State Police to the Oregon Department of Transportation, which has a track record of building construction projects.

ODOT Director Matt Garrett said it’s his understanding the project is behind schedule and his agency is still trying to make sense of the project’s deadlines and budget.

“We talk big numbers,” Garrett said. “But we really need to bring scrutiny to the numbers, the budget, the schedule, the timelines and then how this thing rolls itself out.”

When asked what the project will cost, Garrett replied, “We don’t know yet. That’s a reality.”

Ball, who is retiring Aug. 1, is a former director of the state Department of Administrative Services. On the OWIN project, he answers directly to Kulongoski.

The governor declined to be an interviewed for this story. Kulongoski spokeswoman Anna Richter Taylor said the governor thinks Ball has made tremendous progress with the OWIN project.

“Has this project been more challenging than we thought going in? Yes, without question,” Taylor said.

“While there have been bumps along the way, the governor feels the direction it’s going is the right one and he’s confident (ODOT director) Matt Garrett is the right leader to move this forward.”

Lawmakers say they’ve not been told how far behind schedule the OWIN project has fallen.

“Whenever they talked to us, it was always that they were doing well,” said Rep. Tim Freeman, R-Roseburg, who heard briefings on OWIN while serving on a legislative budget panel and as vice-chairman of the House committee overseeing emergency services.

“But it’s been this pie-in-the-sky thing,” Freeman said. “It’s frustrating spending so many millions and not knowing what the end point is or how much it will really cost.”

OWIN to date has spent $22 million, much of it on radio equipment for tower sites belonging to other government agencies that have joined the state radio network.

Getting local agencies to sign on to the OWIN project has been one of Ball’s biggest accomplishments. Those partnerships helped increase political support for the project around Oregon.

“It’s going to mean we can talk to our neighboring counties during times of emergencies,” said Tillamook County Sheriff Todd Anderson. “And it prepares us for any of the natural disasters that can happen here in Oregon.”

OWIN officials say the partnerships allow agencies and the state to share towers, equipment and expenses, saving the state $60 million.

Ball said the project has been held up by delays in getting its construction company, General Dynamics, under contract to build the radio towers sites. The company signed on in April. Documents show that, even if the contractor had been hired earlier, many OWIN sites still would not have been ready.

Even though lawmakers have frozen most of its budget, the OWIN project has enough money to start construction at some sites in June and July.

Courtney, the Senate president, said it’s going to take an independent report that OWIN is on track before lawmakers release the rest of its money.

“This thing has been a monster since I first started to hear the word ‘OWIN,’ and for some reason we can’t get our hands around this thing,” Courtney said.

After months of wrangling with lawmakers, OWIN officials brought in an outside quality assurance consultant to assess the project. The consultant’s conclusion: “The OWIN Project is well managed and under control.”

But the report’s fine print tells a more complex story. The consultant found the OWIN project lacked cost controls and a comprehensive schedule to meet the 2013 deadline. “Internal schedules do not yet support meeting this completion date,” the report says.

ODOT’s Garrett said that coming up with a defensible price tag and proving the project is back on a reasonable schedule is crucial.

“We have to re-instill confidence that this is a good investment for taxpayers of the state of Oregon,” Garrett said. “This is a lot of money at stake.”

– Brent Walth

I see serious ethical issues when a government entity which is directed by a former Motorola employee recruits a staff of former Motorola employees and then enters into an exclusive and unique business arrangement that would allow Motorola to potentially acquire incredibly valuable spectrum and contracts without a competitive selection process.  This is not in the best interest of the cities and counties in the Bay Area.

This is not the first appearance of impropriety with regard to Bay Area SUASI and Motorola.

• The appearance of impropriety (Part 1)
• The appearance of impropriety (Part 2)

Public safety agencies in the Bay Area already benefit from superb wireless data access provided by Verizon,  Sprint and ATT.  The cost is approximately $50 per month per mobile unit, with no capital investment or capital replacement expense for the subscribing agencies. These carriers have all announced plans to migrate from existing 3G technologies to a 4G systems based in LTE or WiMax.  Would  the Federal grant-funded Motorola deal offer any advantage to Bay Area municipalities, or is the benefit focused on Motorola stakeholders?

Does SUASI’s sponsorship of Motorola’s grant proposal uniquely position Motorola to compete with the incumbent wireless carriers?  Will Motorola provide the hardware, software, engineering and system integration services and ongoing operational support for this proposed taxpayer-funded network without competitive bid?   Does SUASI’s action give an unfair competitive advantage to Motorola?  Is this yet another appearance of impropriety at Bay Area SUASI?

Click here to read the full article as it appeared in Mission Critical Communications, Radio Resource International.

Motorola Applies for $50M in Grants for Bay Area Broadband Network – 04/12/2010

–

On February 24, 2010 the Maple Bluff Fire Department (MBFD) in Dane County Wisconsin performed tests of several portable radios operating in simplex analog and simplex P25 digital mode. They compared the sound quality of the Kenwood TK-5210, Motorola XTS-2500, Motorola XTS-5000, Motorola APX-7000, EF Johnson SL 5100, Tait 9135, and ICOM 9011 under normal firefighter working conditions.  The results of the tests are documented in this video.

The Maple Bluff Fire Department is not endorsing any particular manufacturer, vendor, or radio type, and understand there are radios on the market that were not tested. The radios seen in this test were selected by availability at the time of the test through local vendors.

The tests done by the Maple Bluff Fire Department lacked many controls that would typically be found in a scientific test. Nevertheless, I think the MBFD folks did good work and that the evidence recorded in the video is significant. The most important point from my perspective is the vastly different performance of radios in simplex P25 mode. Perhaps every fire department needs to perform similar testing before making the decision to “go digital.” Please remember that there is no FCC requirement to convert to digital operation.

Please download their Radio Test Worksheet to record your opinion of each radio in their test.

Click here to visit the Maple Bluff Fire Department website.

If you have questions about this test, please contact:

Chief Josh Ripp: jripp at villageofmaplebluff.com
Assistant Chief Brad Ingersoll: bingersoll at villageofmaplebluff.com

Interoperability Money Aids Motorola and Other Contractors, but Are First Responders Better Off?

When a cop or a fire fighter pulls out a radio in a television police drama, his message goes through, whether he’s in the basement of a building or deep in a forest. In the real world, clear communication is rarely so easy, particularly among first responders from different disciplines and jurisdictions. This reality was dramatically brought home at the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, when crucial observations from the police department’s helicopters did not reach fire chiefs, commanders lost radio contact with responders who ascended the towers, and brigades in the north tower did not hear calls to evacuate.

Since then, an unprecedented amount of federal money has been spent on communications gear and technology, expenses traditionally borne by state and local governments. The goal is to fix the communication problems faced on 9/11 — to create “interoperability” that allows first responders from different disciplines and jurisdictions to communicate. From 2004 to 2008, the only years for which detailed figures are available, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) approved more than $4.3 billion in grant money to improve interoperability among first responders nationwide. DHS officials have said that more grant money has gone to interoperability than to any other initiative, and it continues to be a major focus for DHS grant programs, while also drawing funding from the economic stimulus package.

Yet for years, results have failed to live up to expectations. In 2004, then-DHS Secretary Tom Ridge promised that by year’s end, it would be possible for most first responders to talk to each other in a crisis. But in 2005, Hurricane Katrina proved that the country was nowhere near ready to handle a real disaster. By 2009, DHS officials were still struggling to convince Congress that first responders could reach basic communications goals.

“The fundamental question all of us have is this,” said Rep. David Price, whose subcommittee oversees homeland security funding, at a hearing last March. “Why aren’t we making faster progress toward effective interoperability?”

An Over-Reliance on Hardware

Part of the answer is that early on, Congress directed the vast majority of DHS interoperability dollars towards hardware: portable and car radios; “repeaters” that extended a signal’s range; antennae and tower systems. But an array of communications experts and even DHS officials say that equipment alone cannot create interoperability.

“There was a lack of understanding in the congressional committees about the importance of planning dollars, that you could waste money if you don’t plan,” says Harlin McEwen, a former police chief who chairs the communications committee at the International Association of Chiefs of Police. “They didn’t want to spend money on things you couldn’t see.”

Support for those less tangible needs — sitting down at the table with counterparts, hashing out plans, establishing command-and-control protocols, training users — has come much more slowly. And experts say that without such support, the value of spending on equipment is questionable. A 2007 report from the Government Accountability Office warned that the lack of coordination was leading to investments in “independent interoperability systems that do not always support each others’ needs.”

DHS and Congress have increased support for planning and training. But as recently as 2008, more than 75 percent of interoperability dollars still went towards hardware.

The challenges of interoperability could offer lessons for any of the troubled homeland security initiatives launched after 9/11, from increased airport security to a “virtual fence” laden with sensors at the Mexican border. Billions have been spent in an effort to make America safer, but critics wonder whether the push primarily has benefited a burgeoning homeland security industrial complex. Perhaps the only hands-down winners have been the companies that supply communications equipment — Motorola, in particular. Billions in DHS funding have helped public safety agencies replace aging infrastructure, but the effects on those agencies’ interoperability capabilities vary widely. While some jurisdictions report substantive progress, for many of the responders risking their lives, the communication problems brought into sharp relief on 9/11 linger on.

History’s Lessons

September 11 is only the most recent entry in a litany of disasters that documented the need for interoperability. Among them: the 1982 crash of an Air Florida Flight 90 into a Washington, D.C., bridge; the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center bombing; the 1995 bombing of an Oklahoma City federal building; and the 1999 shootings at Colorado’s Columbine High School.

In each case, as a grab-bag of agencies converged on the scene, precious time and efficiency were lost. “Many police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical service personnel working in the same city,” wrote a federal advisory commission in 1996, “cannot communicate with each other.”

The challenge is not just incompatible technology, but disparate cultures. “It’s like three high school [sports teams] in a city,” explains Chief Douglas Aiken, communications chair for the International Association of Fire Chiefs. “They each want to win, and they each have their own funding. They might see each other and talk in passing, but they each are doing their own thing.”

When public safety agencies first began using radios, in the 1920s and ’30s, their equipment was built into cars and used primarily for dispatch. As radios became lighter and more portable, responders gradually came to consider them critical tools. The federal government assigned public safety departments slices of the radio spectrum — electromagnetic real estate — and each agency bought a radio system that operated only within specific frequencies. Systems from different manufacturers could not communicate.

Motorola, based in Schaumburg, Illinois, has long been the undisputed leader in public safety communications equipment, controlling about 80 percent of the U.S. market. By 2001 the firm had cemented its good standing with important groups like the Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials (APCO). The company often sponsors APCO’s state and local events at the most generous levels — “gold” for the 2009 national conference, for instance. Motorola has a few competitors — Harris Corporation, based in Melbourne, Florida, first among them — but local officials consider Motorola the safe choice.

When public safety radios began transitioning to digital technology, organizations like the police chiefs’ and fire chiefs’ associations resolved that they would require manufacturers to provide radios that worked together. In 1989, APCO, whose membership includes both government officials and industry players, began working with vendors to design a crucial series of standards for interoperability, known as Project 25 or P25. Radios that met the P25 criteria in theory would work together, regardless of vendor. The standards define eight different interfaces between various parts of a radio system: the first, for instance, allows two radios from different manufacturers to communicate directly to each other. On 9/11, though, the standards were still incomplete.

Few in the federal government had studied interoperability before 9/11, but in the wake of al-Qaeda’s attacks, policymakers were troubled by the chaotic responses, particularly at Ground Zero, where post-action reports identified a host of issues, from technical failures to breakdowns in command procedures. Emergency communications interoperability suddenly became a national crisis, and Congress turned to the industry and to first responders for solutions. Many first responders asked that Congress dedicate more spectrum to public safety. And Greg Brown, now CEO of Motorola, told Congress in 2003 that the “common, and key, requirements to achieving interoperability include spectrum, standards, and money.”

Money was the first to arrive. After 9/11, Congress began funneling emergency funds to all 50 states. Those funding streams turned into more formal grant programs in 2004: the State Homeland Security Grant Program provided a baseline amount of funding to all 50 states, and the Urban Area Security Initiative handed out additional money to cities that faced greater risks. State agencies charged with overseeing homeland security applied to these and other programs for cash to solve problems, including interoperability, then distributed their allocation to state agencies and local governments. These recipients needed new radio systems and Congress was telling them, go out and buy what you need.

The Missing Link: Planning

Department of Homeland Security officials have said that more grant money has gone to interoperability than to any other initiative, and it continues to be a major focus for DHS grant programs, while also drawing funding from the economic stimulus package. Left out of this discussion, however, was one element that everyone now agrees is crucial: planning. While money began flowing towards interoperability, requirements to plan and coordinate have lagged badly behind expenditures on hardware.

“It is as important as the technology,” says Bob LeGrande, who headed the District of Columbia’s interoperability development. “One cannot exist without the other.”

Without strong relationships in place, agencies have worked towards achieving interoperability locally, without thinking on a regional level, leading to what the GAO has called “the narrow and specific use of DHS funding.” Or they have bought equipment that’s incompatible with surrounding jurisdictions. A 2007 audit of interoperability spending in Colorado worried: “Without … the context of a regional or statewide plan, it is unclear how much unmet need will be addressed by these funds.” DHS officials also worry about “islands of interoperability” — places where jurisdictions have upgraded to new technology without considering how they’ll connect with partners using old gear.

With the right equipment, in theory, every responder could talk to every other responder. Simple connectivity, though, does not guarantee coordination. On 9/11, in New York, those police officers and fire fighters whose radios could connect faced a different challenge. So many people were using the tactical channel meant for interoperability that it became overloaded — a cacophony in which important information could not get through.

The DHS vision for interoperability goes beyond networking first responders’ communication equipment. To DHS officials, interoperability means that officers will be able to communicate with anyone they need to, but only when they need to and when they are authorized to do so. To avoid chaos, they say, public safety officials need to establish strong command and control protocols, standard operating procedures, and, most of all, trust.

Robert Desourdis, an engineer and consultant who has studied interoperability, remembers one exercise during which, under pressure, agencies reverted to using their own systems, instead of using the new technology that was meant to connect them. As Col. G. Jerry Russell, director of the Idaho State Police, put it, “Technology without coordination results in inoperability.”

One academic study of DHS grant spending found that strong planning and coordination correlated with success at creating interoperability, while simply increasing funding did not. Chicago, for instance, has received more than $220 million dollars from the Urban Area Security Initiative grant program. Yet, in a 2007 evaluation of cities nationwide, the city earned DHS’ lowest score on governance, which measured the strength of the formal agreements that provide a foundation for communications planning. Erica Chenoweth and Susan Clarke, who conducted the study, concluded that Chicago’s performance “stems from politics rather than resources,” citing problems like disagreements between two neighboring counties, a lack of clear leadership and accountability, and unfamiliarity with standard operating procedures.

Building the sort of relationships that yield real interoperability can take years. LeGrande credits the success of the D.C. area’s system — one of the few to score 100% on the DHS evaluation — to work that began after the Air Florida crash in 1982. Chris Essid, head of the DHS Office of Emergency Communications, remembers how long it took for the planning process to start working well in Virginia, where he became the statewide interoperability coordinator in 2003. “Our first meeting, you had folks from the localities that didn’t trust the state folks,” he says. “It took a while to get these folks to realize — we have the same problem and we can help each other.”

But when DHS started doling out money, a lot of that hard work had simply not been done. In December 2006, the department reported, “Strategic plans for interoperability are the exception rather than the norm.”

And the lack of planning showed. “You had different fiefdoms doing their own thing,” says Veronique Pluviose-Fenton, a former aide to the House Homeland Security Committee. “It was almost like you were throwing money at the problem without measuring whether or not it was a solution.” Another congressional aide said there was “a lot of money floating around, and if a project met the right buzzword, it got funded.”

In Georgia, for instance, $11 million in federal funding helped build the Georgia Interoperability Network. Months after the system was installed, none of the 81 local dispatch centers connected to the network were using it, according to a 2008 audit.

In the first years of the grant programs, not all emergency management departments had the capacity to oversee the money coming in, either. “Many state and local governments were overwhelmed by the volume of money and the grant guidance,” says Bruce Baughman, a former FEMA official who also served as the director of the Alabama Emergency Management Association.

Chasing the Money

As big money began flowing, a variety of companies saw a business opportunity. Raytheon pitched a product called the ACU-1000, a so-called gateway device that could hook multiple networks together to improve communications. Another popular idea: cells on wheels — COWs for short — involved trucks outfitted with radio gear that could be driven to a disaster site.

In this new gold rush, Motorola had a distinct advantage. Most public safety officials wanted to stick with the solution they knew — the land-based radio systems they already owned and operated — and upgrade to interoperable equipment. In this market, that meant P25 equipment, and in 2001, Motorola was the leading supplier, the only supplier of some P25 components for certain frequencies.

In 2001, though, P25 technology was far from perfect. The only standard that was fully developed was the “common air interface” that allowed individual radios to connect with each other. Standards that would link whole systems together were still in flux. Even so, after 9/11, the federal government recommended that grantees buy P25.

That was a boon for Motorola, as well as for competitors like Harris. “[Our] business is well positioned to participate in this emerging opportunity as customers solidify their funding for safety and security,” said a 2002 Motorola disclosure filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Motorola’s government business is not its largest component, but “it’s by far the most profitable thing they do,” says Tavis McCourt, a senior research analyst at investment firm Morgan Keegan, who follows the company. Motorola has reorganized several times since 2001, changing the way it reports profits, so tracking its public safety business is difficult. But in recent years, Motorola has identified homeland security as the driving force behind increased sales in its government business. In 2008, public safety drove the company’s $1.5 billion operating profit in its enterprise mobility sector; its mobile phone business, by contrast, lost $2.2 billion. Motorola recently announced that, starting in 2011, its government segment, which manufactures emergency radio equipment, will be spun off as part of an independent company. Motorola declined to respond to inquiries regarding this story.

Motorola: Lobbying and Campaign Cash

A variety of vendors positioned their products as the solution for interoperability, but none more aggressively than Motorola. Motorola’s lobbying budget nearly doubled, from just under $4 million in 2002 to $7.6 million in 2005, before dropping modestly in more recent years, according to Senate lobbying records. Alongside increasing in-house lobbying activities, outside lobbying assistance mushroomed, as well. In 2002, the company spent just $300,000 on contract lobbyists; in 2005, outside lobbyists reported $2.3 million in business from Motorola. Over that period, the number of lobbyists reporting Motorola as a client increased from 46 to 105. And while, before 9/11, the company’s work in Washington for public safety focused on spectrum regulation, by 2004, interoperability, now a powerful concept, appeared in all of its lobbying reports.

The company’s political action committee also increased its activity after 9/11. Contributions to political candidates jumped from $202,201 in the 2001-02 election cycle to more than $524,000 in 2005-06, before dipping just a bit in 2007-08, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. Top recipients of Motorola contributions included Illinois politicians like Rep. Mark Kirk and Sen. Dick Durbin, as well as members with new security-related duties, like Rep. Christopher Cox (R-Calif.), the first chair of the House Homeland Security Committee, and Rep. Henry Cuellar (D-Texas), now chair of that panel’s emergency communications subcommittee. President Barack Obama did not accept donations from PACs during his presidential campaign, but his Senate campaign received $4,500 from the company between 2004 and 2006.

As money trickled down from the federal level, Motorola ramped up its lobbying in state capitals, as well. In New York, the company’s lobbying budget grew from $48,000 in 2005, when it listed no lobbying issues on disclosure documents, to more than $444,500 in 2008, when its focus was on public safety communications, according to state lobbying records. In California, Motorola’s lobbying increased from more than $74,000 in the 2003-2004 cycle to more than $171,000 in the 2007-2008 cycle.

On a federal level, the company’s effort focused on ensuring its products, including P25 systems, would be eligible for grant dollars. Motorola executives testified at numerous hearings on emergency communications problems, emphasizing the need for more dollars. Lobbyists also held meetings with officials at the Office of Management and Budget and at the Office of Homeland Security, who were hammering out the details on what sort of products grant money could buy.

A Motorola Standard?

That work paid off. “The debate was driven by companies like Motorola and Ericsson [now Harris] to ensure that the solutions that were promoted were these large, statewide systems,” says one homeland security consultant who has worked with both state and federal governments.

Motorola wasn’t the only company peddling its equipment, of course. Homeland security leaders often mention those gateway devices, like Raytheon’s ACU-1000, as a cost-effective option for creating interoperability. (Whereas P25 systems can run into the hundreds of millions, gateways cost much less — nowadays, around $10,000.) But when DHS published its “interoperability continuum,” showing the steps public safety agencies could take to reach interoperability, gateways ranked lower.

Besides the continuum, it was the fine print of those DHS grant programs that provided the strongest push for state and local governments seeking interoperability money, and in 2003 and 2004, that fine print emphasized the systems meeting the P25 standards. “All radios purchased under this grant should be APCO 25 compliant,” stated an official DHS guidance to grant applicants. The language has softened since then, but DHS still says that the highest level of interoperability should include a “standards-based shared system,” in practice, a P25 system.

In the first years after 9/11, procurement requests from state and local officials for P25 systems often garnered only one bid, Motorola’s. An audit of a communications project in Alaska, for instance, reported that, because of the type of equipment the project was looking for — a P25 system — the only vendor able to fulfill their requirements was Motorola.

Although some officials chalk up Motorola’s lead in P25 to its dominance in the industry, others worry that Motorola’s long relationship with and support of APCO gave the company an additional boost. “The Motorola influence gets those standards written in a way that’s beneficial to them,” says one long-time public safety official.

A few different companies were involved in APCO’s standard-setting process from the beginning, but Motorola was by far the biggest and had the most resources to devote to research and development, according to sources familiar with the process.

“There have always been allegations that P25 was a Motorola standard,” says Chief McEwen. That’s because, he says, Motorola was the company that started developing products in cooperation with the public safety community’s push towards standards, while others were more reluctant. “We were encouraging all companies to participate in the standard, and Motorola was the one to do it,” he says.

Failing To Meet Requirements

While some jurisdictions praise their P25 systems, others have run into trouble. Delaware was one of the earlier adopters of P25 equipment, and state officials say the system has served them well. But New York State canceled a contract worth more than $2 billion for a statewide system built by Harris’ predecessor (then called M/A-Com), after the system failed a battery of tests. (The company disputed the test results and argued that the state canceled the contract for its own budgetary reasons.)

It is not clear that P25 equipment sold throughout this decade lives up to its promises, no matter who’s making it. Some essential standards are still in development, notably the one that will connect responders who use different vendors’ equipment and different frequencies. The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) started testing P25 equipment in 2004, and in 2006 Dereck Orr, NIST’s program manager for public safety communications, reported to Congress, “NIST found that none of the available radios met all aspects of the standard.” In 2007, a GAO report recommended that DHS remove the P25 recommendation until the standards were finished.

“While states and localities have purchased Project 25 radios at the direction of DHS, there is little indication that these radios have enhanced interoperability,” the report stated. “Most jurisdictions we visited were not using the Project 25 capabilities.” DHS, however, boasted of “tremendous recent progress with P25” and said that that “muting the P25 language would remove all incentives for manufacturers to participate in completing the P25 standards.”

In 2007, DHS did promise to work with vendors to methodically verify if P25 products can actually interoperate across equipment from different manufacturer; grantees could then buy only those that passed. The department finally certified labs to test products in 2009. The first phase of testing applies only to the first standard — the common air interface, which allows radios to connect with each other. Certificates of compliance will be posted online; the first three were awarded to Harris in December 2009. These tests do not cover newer P25 equipment that links together systems operating on different frequency bands; DHS is working with public safety agencies to pilot a new technology, multi-band radios, which serves the same purpose.

Making Progress

After years of giving out money for equipment, DHS is starting to focus more on planning. Following Hurricane Katrina, Congress created an ongoing interoperability grant program that supports planning, although, at $50 million per year, it represents only a fraction of the total dollars going to interoperability. Congress also pushed DHS to create the Office of Emergency Communications (OEC), which now works toward achieving interoperable emergency communications nationwide. The OEC has focused on tasks like helping states create statewide plans and interoperability governing bodies. For most of 2007, its first year of life, however, the office was short-handed.

Still, by October 2007, all 50 states had submitted plans for how they would achieve interoperability. Many of the original plans needed to be revised, however. As of July 2008, the OEC had created an emergency communications plan that set national interoperability goals for the first time, and reported significant progress. As of July 2009, 46 of 55 milestones set out for the plan’s first year were met.

OEC has also been meeting with statewide interoperability coordinators, many of whom are defining positions that did not exist a few years ago. Essid, the office’s director, says that 70 percent of the requests coming to OEC’s technical assistance lines are for help on governance, standard operating procedures, training, and exercises. Essid recalls one police officer pulling out his radio, and telling him: “I get more training on infectious diseases than on my radio. This thing knows how to do things I have no clue.”

There remains a fundamental dissonance between how legislators and public safety leaders look at interoperability. Congressional leaders often talk as if one more policy decision, like an increase in grant funding, will solve the interoperability problem. Public safety leaders and DHS officials, however, talk about interoperability as a core goal that will need attention for as long as technology advances. In this view, public safety workers regularly need to refresh their communications skills, the way police officers qualify to operate their weapons or fire fighters train with their equipment.

“In Congress, they tend to want to identify a problem, fix it, and go on to something else,” says Chief McEwen. But when it comes to interoperability, he says, “The problem will never be totally solved. It’s a moving target.”

G.W. Schulz of the Center for Investigative Reporting contributed to this article.

(Reprinted with permission)

Hamilton County (Ohio) firefighters hate a communication system that taxpayers spent $35 million on because it doesn’t do what it’s supposed to do when they’re in a burning building: Let them talk to each other.

The radio failures – which some firefighters say happen daily – played a role in the death of two Colerain Township firefighters nearly two years ago and local fire chiefs say if a solution isn’t found other firefighters’ lives are at risk.

The issue surfaced again last week when radio problems resulted in a near miss for Cincinnati Firefighter Kevin Phillips who fell down a set of stairs, which knocked his helmet and air mask loose, causing him to become disoriented.

A transcript of the radio transmissions obtained by The Enquirer shows it took three minutes before fire command at the scene responded to the mayday call by Phillips’ partner, an eternity in a burning building, firefighters say.

Cincinnati Fire Chief Robert Wright did not return two calls for comment. Firefighters at the Glenway blaze say Wright met with them Tuesday, listened to their concerns and asked what would help them.

Hamilton County taxpayers spent $35 million on the digital Motorola system which was activated in 2003, replacing a fire radio system that dated to the 1940s and a police system that was nearly as old. The new system was hailed for allowing agencies to talk to each other, an impossibility on the old system.

But problems crop up when more than one firefighter tries to talk at once, resulting in firefighters getting a busy signal when they try to call and in garbled transmissions due to background noise like engines and burning buildings. In addition, metal construction blocks communication when firefighters are inside large buildings like downtown high rises or hospitals.

“We’re finding out this is happening every day, not just in big fires,” said B.J. Jetter, Sycamore Township Fire Chief and president of the Hamilton County Fire Chiefs Association.

“And not only with fire and EMS, but for police too,” he said. “It’s system wide.”

The issue came to the forefront in April 2008, when Colerain fire Capt. Robin Broxterman and firefighter Brian Schira died in a blaze on Squirrel’s Nest Lane. A review of the radio calls made during the fire showed the firefighters repeatedly made mayday calls, which were never transmitted.

“I don’t think the full impact or level of concern (about the issue) was realized until we were able to see the radio call log from the Squirrel’s Nest fire,” said Colerain Fire Chief Bruce Smith.

Broxterman’s parents are suing over the fatal fire, naming in the lawsuit among others, Motorola.

The problem became evident to all county public safety agencies during the Sept. 14, 2008, windstorm. All agencies were trying to use the radios at once. While that is an extreme situation, it locked up radios and prevented people from communicating.

County communication center officials questioned Motorola about possible fixes, but there isn’t a solution right now, the company told the county, said Mike Bailey, of the Hamilton County Communication Center.

“This is not an extreme emergency at this point, but it is a very big concern,” Bailey said.

A Motorola spokesman in charge of public safety for North America did not return a call for comment.

Cincinnati Fire department spokesman Capt. Michael Washington said the current system is better than the old one, and the department must work with what it has.

As the county grapples with what to do, Jetter said firefighters, police officers and the public are in danger. “It gives me heartburn that we have this situation,” he said.

Fire departments nationwide have reported problems with the digital radios.

The city of Phoenix has the same system, but when fighting a blaze the fire department uses the old analog system that transmits calls radio to radio, instead of through a computer system.

The International Association of Fire Fighters is now recommending fire department not use digital systems in fires.

“Radios are the most important piece of safety equipment a firefighter has,” said Richard Duffy, assistant to the president of the international union. “If you can’t communicate on the fire ground, you put yourself and others at risk.”

Duffy said Motorola should be held accountable.

Jetter said the problem is so bad it’s almost like having no communication at all. “We’re going back to the old days of using runners, where somebody runs in to deliver a message,” he said. “In an age of technology, this shouldn’t be an issue.”

Cincinnati Fire Union President Marc Monahan said last week’s missed mayday call “could have been really bad.” “We’ve had problems, we’ve pointed them out and nothing has been done,” he said. “Hopefully, this is enough evidence that will force some changes.”

The union plans to once again address the issue with fire administrators at the quarterly safety committee meeting Wednesday. Jetter said he’s not sure what the solution is. “We can complain all we want,” he said. “I don’t know how this gets resolved.”

Link to the original article.

Link to a related article with video.

A FICTIONAL TALE OF POLITICAL REALITY

(Ford, Chevy, and Dodge are used herein only to illustrate a point related the procurement of some public-safety radio systems.  All three are fine automakers and the references to these brand names are purely anecdotal.)

County X wanted new squad cars, and it really, really wanted Ford. They looked at Chevy and Dodge, but its employees really, really wanted Ford.

County X found out that Ford was working on a hydrogen-hybrid squad car, and the County thought that this was really cool. Chevy and Dodge have been working on hybrids using various technologies, and Chevy had an electric-gas hybrid but it wasn’t sexy enough for the County. Besides, “it’s a Chevy and we like Fords”. Dodge had not offered any hybrid solution yet in the marketplace. Besides, the DOT has not completed standards yet for hydrogen hybrids.

The State of Y offered a state contract for leasing Fords. County X found out they can side-step all bidding if they “bought” off of the State’s contracts. So County X takes State Y’s specs for Ford (that does not include hydrogen-hybrid as an option), and declares that they do not need open bidding since Fords were on the State’s contract.

No one challenged the “lease versus purchase” nature of the state contract, and no one noticed that hydrogen-hybrid technology was not offered in the State’s contract  County X had no intent to ever lease the cars and intended only to buy cars.

Some folks asked, “Have you seen the hydrogen hybrid before” and “can we test-drive it before we get them”?  “No” was the answer, “…but you know, Ford is a reputable car maker, we believe it will work, most cops drive Fords anyway, so we’re convinced everything will be OK”.

So, County X declares it will be impossible to openly bid this purchase, becomes convinced that while Chevy and Dodge were also working on hybrid squad cars, it could only buy Fords. So, unchallenged, it does not advertise bidding, it does not disclose that they were negotiating with Ford, and processes a Purchase Order  for “10 Ford hydrogen-hybrid squad cars”.

At public meetings, there was enough obfuscation and razzle-dazzle that the purchase order flew right through. Besides “…our cops deserve the best, right?”.

The Ford dealer shows up with a brand-new standard gas-powered Ford squad car with a hydrogen tank under his arm. The Ford guy says, “Do you mind if we consider your county as a BETA test site, since we’ve never done this hydrogen-thing before?”. A loud noise was heard – it was the eyebrows of the Chevy and Dodge dealer snapping to attention.

It turns out that Ford did not finalize the design for the hydrogen-hybrid, it was still designing the parts, and still working on the software that controls the hydrogen-hybrid car’s function. County X says, “sure we’d love to help you, you are a reputable vendor, and we love Fords”. The county then buys hydrogen storage tanks and dispensing equipment with yet another no-bid contract.

Time goes by and the BETA tests are not going well. The county determines that it needs 9 more squad cars and by way of a flawed change-order process, and orders 9 more cars under the same sole-source, no-bid contract. County rules say that if any contract has a change order of more than 50%, it needs to be tossed out and open bidding must take place. But, “our cops deserve the best, right?”.

Time goes on, and the BETA test continues to struggle. In one case, the hydrogen-hybrid car gets so hot, it starts a fire in the County garage.

The County decides to hire a professional engineer, a hydrogen squad car manager who will run the fleet once it hits the street.  It starts holding public meetings with the potential users of the hydrogen-hybrid squad cars. More problems are revealed in those meetings.

The Public Safety Chairman gets out a calculator and determines that they can’t afford to complete the contract for 19 squad cars, but also realizes that hydrogen is expensive, hard to manage (contain, dispense, and use) and declares that “we can’t afford this project”.

So, all pubic meetings stop. The Public Safety Chairman privately meets with the vendor to try to arrive at a “solution”.  Observers sense that there will be no hydrogen-hybrid squad cars forthcoming.

How will this story end? No one knows…yet. The plot to the final ending is being written behind closed doors.

Will the original contract be canceled? Will the change-order be withdrawn? Will the engineer and manager lose their jobs? Will anyone go to jail? “No one got fired for buying Ford” has been a common mantra in County X and State Y, but history might be made in County X.

Here are some links to documents that may be associated with this fictional story.

• Dupage panel ponders rocketing costs – 12/13/2009
• Dupage County IL – RF Committee Packet – 12/17/2009
• DuPage_County Letter – Page 1 of 2
• DuPage County Letter – Page 2 of 2
• Village of Woodridge Interoperability Statement
• Monthly report from John Lozar
• DuPage County procurement policy